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The Handbook examines the most important issues that arise in antitrust economics. Leading scholars in the field provide detailed critical analysis of developments across a number of different antitrust topics along with a detailed review of the literature. The Handbook is invaluable as a research and teaching tool.
Roger D. Blair is Walter J. Matherly Professor, Department of Economics at the University of Florida where he has taught for 40 years. His research interests center on antitrust economics and policy. In addition to numerous articles in economics journals and law reviews, he has published Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control, Antitrust Economics, Monopsony in Law and Economics, and Antitrust Law, Volume II with Areeda and Hovenkamp. Dr. Blair has also served as an expert witness in over 50 cases.; D. Daniel Sokol is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Florida Levin College of Law. He is co-editor of the Global Competition Law and Economics book series (Stanford University Press) and of the Oxford Handbook of Antitrust Compliance (Oxford University Press, forthcoming). He also is editor of the Antitrust and Competition Policy Blog. Professor Sokol has provided technical assistance and capacity building to antitrust agencies and utilities regulators from around the world.
INTRODUCTION AND INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES; 1. Rationales for Antitrust: Economics and Other Bases; Daniel A. Crane; 2. Antitrust Enforcement Regimes: Fundamental Differences; Keith N. Hylton; 3. Economic Analysis of Antitrust Exemptions; Peter Carstensen; 4. Healthcare Provider and Payer Markets; Cory S. Capps and David Dranove; 5. International Antitrust Institutions; Oliver Budzinski; 6. Competition Policy in Public Choice Perspective; Fred S. McChesney, Michael Reksulak, and William F. Shughart II; 7. Antitrust Settlements; Daniel L. Rubinfeld; 8. The Economics of Antitrust Class Actions; Roger D. Blair and Christine Piette Durrance; 9. Behavioral Economics and Antitrust; Mark Armstrong and Steffen Huck; 10. Experimental Economics in Antitrust; Wieland Muller and Hans-Theo Normann; 11. Optimal Antitrust Remedies: A Synthesis; William H. Page; 12. Private Antitrust Enforcement in the United States and the European Union: Standing and Antitrust Injury; Jeffrey L. Harrison; 13. Freedom to Trade and the Competitive Process; Aaron Edlin and Joseph Farrell; II. MONOPOLY: STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS; 14. Monopoly and Dominant Firms: Antitrust Economics and Policy Approaches; Lawrence J. White; 15. Market Definition; Louis Kaplow; 16. Bilateral Monopoly: Economic Analysis and Antitrust Policy; Roger D. Blair and Christina DePasquale; 17. Antitrust and the Economics of Networks; Daniel F. Spulber and Christopher S. Yoo; 18. The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Businesses; David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee; III. MERGERS; 19. Efficiency Claims and Antitrust Enforcement; Howard Shelanski; 20. Unilateral Effects; Bryan Keating and Robert D. Willig; 21. Coordinated Effects: Evolution of Practice and Theory; Jith Jayaratne and Janusz Ordover; 22. Buyer Power in Merger Review; Dennis W. Carlton, Mary Coleman, and Mark Israel; 23. Vertical Mergers; Michael A. Salinger
Show moreThe Handbook examines the most important issues that arise in antitrust economics. Leading scholars in the field provide detailed critical analysis of developments across a number of different antitrust topics along with a detailed review of the literature. The Handbook is invaluable as a research and teaching tool.
Roger D. Blair is Walter J. Matherly Professor, Department of Economics at the University of Florida where he has taught for 40 years. His research interests center on antitrust economics and policy. In addition to numerous articles in economics journals and law reviews, he has published Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control, Antitrust Economics, Monopsony in Law and Economics, and Antitrust Law, Volume II with Areeda and Hovenkamp. Dr. Blair has also served as an expert witness in over 50 cases.; D. Daniel Sokol is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Florida Levin College of Law. He is co-editor of the Global Competition Law and Economics book series (Stanford University Press) and of the Oxford Handbook of Antitrust Compliance (Oxford University Press, forthcoming). He also is editor of the Antitrust and Competition Policy Blog. Professor Sokol has provided technical assistance and capacity building to antitrust agencies and utilities regulators from around the world.
INTRODUCTION AND INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES; 1. Rationales for Antitrust: Economics and Other Bases; Daniel A. Crane; 2. Antitrust Enforcement Regimes: Fundamental Differences; Keith N. Hylton; 3. Economic Analysis of Antitrust Exemptions; Peter Carstensen; 4. Healthcare Provider and Payer Markets; Cory S. Capps and David Dranove; 5. International Antitrust Institutions; Oliver Budzinski; 6. Competition Policy in Public Choice Perspective; Fred S. McChesney, Michael Reksulak, and William F. Shughart II; 7. Antitrust Settlements; Daniel L. Rubinfeld; 8. The Economics of Antitrust Class Actions; Roger D. Blair and Christine Piette Durrance; 9. Behavioral Economics and Antitrust; Mark Armstrong and Steffen Huck; 10. Experimental Economics in Antitrust; Wieland Muller and Hans-Theo Normann; 11. Optimal Antitrust Remedies: A Synthesis; William H. Page; 12. Private Antitrust Enforcement in the United States and the European Union: Standing and Antitrust Injury; Jeffrey L. Harrison; 13. Freedom to Trade and the Competitive Process; Aaron Edlin and Joseph Farrell; II. MONOPOLY: STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS; 14. Monopoly and Dominant Firms: Antitrust Economics and Policy Approaches; Lawrence J. White; 15. Market Definition; Louis Kaplow; 16. Bilateral Monopoly: Economic Analysis and Antitrust Policy; Roger D. Blair and Christina DePasquale; 17. Antitrust and the Economics of Networks; Daniel F. Spulber and Christopher S. Yoo; 18. The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Businesses; David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee; III. MERGERS; 19. Efficiency Claims and Antitrust Enforcement; Howard Shelanski; 20. Unilateral Effects; Bryan Keating and Robert D. Willig; 21. Coordinated Effects: Evolution of Practice and Theory; Jith Jayaratne and Janusz Ordover; 22. Buyer Power in Merger Review; Dennis W. Carlton, Mary Coleman, and Mark Israel; 23. Vertical Mergers; Michael A. Salinger
Show moreINTRODUCTION AND INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
1. Rationales for Antitrust: Economics and Other Bases
Daniel A. Crane
2. Antitrust Enforcement Regimes: Fundamental Differences
Keith N. Hylton
3. Economic Analysis of Antitrust Exemptions
Peter Carstensen
4. Healthcare Provider and Payer Markets
Cory S. Capps and David Dranove
5. International Antitrust Institutions
Oliver Budzinski
6. Competition Policy in Public Choice Perspective
Fred S. McChesney, Michael Reksulak, and William F. Shughart II
7. Antitrust Settlements
Daniel L. Rubinfeld
8. The Economics of Antitrust Class Actions
Roger D. Blair and Christine Piette Durrance
9. Behavioral Economics and Antitrust
Mark Armstrong and Steffen Huck
10. Experimental Economics in Antitrust
Wieland Müller and Hans-Theo Normann
11. Optimal Antitrust Remedies: A Synthesis
William H. Page
12. Private Antitrust Enforcement in the United States and the
European Union: Standing and Antitrust Injury
Jeffrey L. Harrison
13. Freedom to Trade and the Competitive Process
Aaron Edlin and Joseph Farrell
II. MONOPOLY: STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS
14. Monopoly and Dominant Firms: Antitrust Economics and Policy
Approaches
Lawrence J. White
15. Market Definition
Louis Kaplow
16. Bilateral Monopoly: Economic Analysis and Antitrust Policy
Roger D. Blair and Christina DePasquale
17. Antitrust and the Economics of Networks
Daniel F. Spulber and Christopher S. Yoo
18. The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Businesses
David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee
III. MERGERS
19. Efficiency Claims and Antitrust Enforcement
Howard Shelanski
20. Unilateral Effects
Bryan Keating and Robert D. Willig
21. Coordinated Effects: Evolution of Practice and Theory
Jith Jayaratne and Janusz Ordover
22. Buyer Power in Merger Review
Dennis W. Carlton, Mary Coleman, and Mark Israel
23. Vertical Mergers
Michael A. Salinger
Roger D. Blair is Walter J. Matherly Professor, Department of
Economics at the University of Florida where he has taught for 40
years. His research interests center on antitrust economics and
policy. In addition to numerous articles in economics journals and
law reviews, he has published Law and Economics of Vertical
Integration and Control, Antitrust Economics, Monopsony in Law and
Economics, and Antitrust Law, Volume II with Areeda and Hovenkamp.
Dr. Blair has
also served as an expert witness in over 50 cases.
D. Daniel Sokol is an Associate Professor of Law at the University
of Florida Levin College of Law. He is co-editor of the Global
Competition Law and Economics book series (Stanford University
Press) and of the Oxford Handbook of Antitrust Compliance (Oxford
University Press, forthcoming). He also is editor of the Antitrust
and Competition Policy Blog. Professor Sokol has provided technical
assistance and capacity building to antitrust agencies and
utilities regulators from around the world.
Antitrust economics (or competition economics) has truly been a
vibrant field of research over the past decades ... The handbook by
Blair and Sokol serves as a distinct proof of this progress in
knowledge. Moreover, it nicely illustrates the close collaboration
between law and economics.
*Dr Arndt Christiansen, Economist, Bundeskartellamt (Economic
Competition Law Review, 2016)*
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