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The era of economic liberalization, spanning 1978 to 2008, is often regarded as a period in which government was simply dismantled. In fact, government was reconstructed to meet the needs of a globalized economy. Central banking, fiscal control, tax collection, regulation, port and airport management, infrastructure development-in all of these areas, radical reforms were made to the architecture of government.A common philosophy shaped all of
these reforms: the logic of discipline. It was premised on deep skepticism about the ability of democratic processes to make sensible policy choices. It sought to impose constraints on elected
officials and citizens, often by shifting power to technocrat-guardians who were shielded from political influence. It placed great faith in the power of legal changes--new laws, treaties, and contracts--to produce significant alterations in the performance of governmental systems. Even before the global economic crisis of 2007-2009, the logic of discipline was under assault. Faced with many failed reform projects, advocates of discipline realized that they had underestimated the complexity of
governmental change. Opponents of discipline emphasized the damage to democratic values that followed from the empowerment of new groups of technocrat-guardians.The financial
crisis did further damage to the logic of discipline, as governments modified their attitudes about central bank independence and fiscal control, and global financial and trade flows declined. It was the market that now appeared to behave myopically and erratically--and which now insisted that governments should abandon precepts about the role of government that it had once insisted were inviolable.A sweeping account of neoliberal governmental restructuring across the
world, The Logic of Discipline offers a powerful analysis of how this undemocratic model is unraveling in the face of a monumental--and ongoing--failure of the market.
The era of economic liberalization, spanning 1978 to 2008, is often regarded as a period in which government was simply dismantled. In fact, government was reconstructed to meet the needs of a globalized economy. Central banking, fiscal control, tax collection, regulation, port and airport management, infrastructure development-in all of these areas, radical reforms were made to the architecture of government.A common philosophy shaped all of
these reforms: the logic of discipline. It was premised on deep skepticism about the ability of democratic processes to make sensible policy choices. It sought to impose constraints on elected
officials and citizens, often by shifting power to technocrat-guardians who were shielded from political influence. It placed great faith in the power of legal changes--new laws, treaties, and contracts--to produce significant alterations in the performance of governmental systems. Even before the global economic crisis of 2007-2009, the logic of discipline was under assault. Faced with many failed reform projects, advocates of discipline realized that they had underestimated the complexity of
governmental change. Opponents of discipline emphasized the damage to democratic values that followed from the empowerment of new groups of technocrat-guardians.The financial
crisis did further damage to the logic of discipline, as governments modified their attitudes about central bank independence and fiscal control, and global financial and trade flows declined. It was the market that now appeared to behave myopically and erratically--and which now insisted that governments should abandon precepts about the role of government that it had once insisted were inviolable.A sweeping account of neoliberal governmental restructuring across the
world, The Logic of Discipline offers a powerful analysis of how this undemocratic model is unraveling in the face of a monumental--and ongoing--failure of the market.
1. The Logic of Discipline
2. The Quiet Revolution: Central Bank Independence
3. Treasury Power and Fiscal Rules
4. Islands in the Public Sector: Tax Collectors
5. The Gates of Trade: Autonomous Mainports
6. Protecting Capital: Independent Regulators and Super-Courts
7. Devils in the Details: Long Term Infrastructure Contracts
8. Beyond Discipline
Appendix: Notes and Sources for Figures
Alasdair Roberts is the Jerome L. Rappaport Professor of Law and
Public Policy at Suffolk University Law School. He is also a Fellow
of the US National Academy of Public Administration and an Honorary
Senior Research Fellow of the School of Public Policy, University
College London. Professor Roberts received his law degree from the
University of Toronto and his PhD in public policy from Harvard
University. He is co-editor of the journal
Governance.
"This concise and provocative book has a readability that belies
its dense subject matter. The evidence produced by Roberts to
support his points is thorough and compelling, but rarely
overdone."--Times Literary Supplement
"The argument is intriguing, and can explain not only the movement
toward autonomous central banks and legislation mandating budgetary
restraint, but also the move toward management by contract (or New
Public Management) and the effort to explicitly define performance
measures for holding top managers accountable."--Public
Administrations Review
"Government reform is like the weather--everyone talks about it but
few people really know how to change it. Until, that is, this
terrific new book by Alasdair Roberts, which stokes our
intellectual capital for tackling the big changes government needs
and builds the case for how to make these reforms work."--Donald F.
Kettl, Dean, University of Maryland School of Public Policy and
author of The Next Government of the United States
"In this provocative and wide-ranging book Alasdair Roberts uses
the current economic crisis to reveal deep flaws in a wide range of
reforms popular at the end of the twentieth century. His cases
range from central banks to independent regulatory agencies to
privately managed infrastructure projects. Throughout the world,
reformers embraced the same 'logic of discipline.' All suffered
from a naïve faith in institutions and expertise as solutions to
the
excesses of political and popular control. Support for independent,
apolitical bodies arose from a perceived gap between the demands of
global capitalism and popular pressures. But Roberts shows in case
after
case that the logic of discipline did not work even on its own
terms. The current crisis has brought democratic accountability
back to the fore."--Susan Rose-Ackerman, Professor of
Jurisprudence, Yale Law School
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