Much has been written about franchising in economics over the last two decades: researchers have gained important insights, especially into how and why it works and into the reasons behind the various forms of vertical restraints usually embedded in these contracts. This authoritative volume presents the key papers that have introduced the theoretical frameworks and the empirical facts that have spurred the interest of scholars in franchising as an organizational form. By combining all these contributions in a single volume, this collection not only highlights the main questions that have been addressed in the literature on franchising, but also illustrates the important role that incentive issues have played in it. As a result, this compilation should be of special interest to economists and management scholars with an interest in franchising but also to those interested in general issues concerning the organization of the firm.
Much has been written about franchising in economics over the last two decades: researchers have gained important insights, especially into how and why it works and into the reasons behind the various forms of vertical restraints usually embedded in these contracts. This authoritative volume presents the key papers that have introduced the theoretical frameworks and the empirical facts that have spurred the interest of scholars in franchising as an organizational form. By combining all these contributions in a single volume, this collection not only highlights the main questions that have been addressed in the literature on franchising, but also illustrates the important role that incentive issues have played in it. As a result, this compilation should be of special interest to economists and management scholars with an interest in franchising but also to those interested in general issues concerning the organization of the firm.
Contents:
Acknowledgements
Introduction Francine Lafontaine
PART I AGENCY THEORY AND FRANCHISING
1. Richard E. Caves and William F. Murphy II (1976), ‘Franchising:
Firms, Markets, and Intangible Assets’
2. Paul H. Rubin (1978), ‘The Theory of the Firm and the Structure
of the Franchise Contract’
3. G. Frank Mathewson and Ralph A. Winter (1985), ‘The Economics of
Franchise Contracts’
4. James A. Brickley and Frederick H. Dark (1987), ‘The Choice of
Organizational Form: The Case of Franchising’
5. Francine Lafontaine (1992), ‘Agency Theory and Franchising: Some
Empirical Results’
6. Andrea Shepard (1993), ‘Contractual Form, Retail Price, and
Asset Characteristics in Gasoline Retailing’
7. Sugato Bhattacharyya and Francine Lafontaine (1995),
‘Double-sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts’
8. Nancy A. Lutz (1995), ‘Ownership Rights and Incentives in
Franchising’
9. Francine Lafontaine and Sugato Bhattacharyya (1995), ‘The Role
of Risk in Franchising’
10. Asher A. Blass and Dennis W. Carlton (2001), ‘The Choice of
Organizational Form in Gasoline Retailing and the Cost of Laws that
Limit that Choice’
11. Francine Lafontaine and Kathryn L. Shaw (2005), ‘Targeting
Managerial Control: Evidence from Franchising’
PART II SELF-ENFORCEMENT AND FRANCHISING
12. Benjamin Klein (1980), ‘Transaction Cost Determinants of
“Unfair” Contractual Arrangements’
13. James A. Brickley, Frederick H. Dark and Michael S. Weisbach
(1991), ‘The Economic Effects of Franchise Termination Laws’
14. Patrick J. Kaufmann and Francine Lafontaine (1994), ‘Costs of
Control: The Source of Economic Rents for McDonald’s
Franchisees’
15. Benjamin Klein (1995) ‘The Economics of Franchise
Contracts’
PART III MULTI-TASKING AND COMPLEMENTARITIES
16. Margaret E. Slade (1996), ‘Multitask Agency and Contract
Choice: An Empirical Exploration’
17. Francine Lafontaine and Margaret E. Slade (1996), ‘Retail
Contracting and Costly Monitoring: Theory and Evidence’
18. Jeffrey L. Bradach (1997), ‘Using the Plural Form in the
Management of Restaurant Chains’
19. James A. Brickley (1999), ‘Incentive Conflicts and Contractual
Restraints: Evidence from Franchising’
20. Francine Lafontaine and Emmanuel Raynaud (2002), ‘Residual
Claims and Self-enforcement as Incentive Mechanisms in Franchise
Contracts: Substitutes or Complements?’
PART IV FRANCHISING AND OUTLET-LEVEL OUTCOMES
21. John P. Shelton (1967), ‘Allocative Efficiency vs.
“X-Efficiency”: Comment’
22. John M. Barron and John R. Umbeck (1984), ‘The Effects of
Different Contractual Arrangements: The Case of Retail Gasoline
Markets’
23. Richard L. Smith II (1982), ‘Franchise Regulation: An Economic
Analysis of State Restrictions on Automobile Distribution’
24. Alan B. Krueger (1991), ‘Ownership, Agency, and Wages: An
Examination of Franchising in the Fast Food Industry’
25. Margaret E. Slade (1998), ‘Beer and the Tie: Did Divestiture of
Brewer-owned Public Houses Lead to Higher Beer Prices?’
26. Steven C. Michael (2000), ‘The Effect of Organizational Form on
Quality: The Case of Franchising’
Name Index
Edited by Francine Lafontaine, Professor of Business Economics and Public Policy and Professor of Economics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, US
'An excellent collection of the best recent research examining
franchise contracting and related organizational issues from both
theoretical and empirical perspectives.'
*Paul L. Joskow, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, US*
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